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Abstract 
This study assesses the social, political, economic, and traffic-/travel-related 
predictors of sworn highway patrol and state police strength in the United States 
between 1981 and 2015. Fixed-effects estimates based on analyses of 1,635 state-
years indicate that theoretical accounts centered on racial threat theory, partisan 
politics, and gendered politics in part explain variation in this outcome. Findings 
suggest that changes in population density, the tax base, the percentage of the 
population without a high school degree, violent crime rates, and spending on social 
welfare at the state level, as well as shifts in local law enforcement strength, also 
influence state police and patrol organization strength over this period. Surprisingly, 
fluctuations in the number of state traffic fatalities per million vehicle miles traveled 
and the number of driver’s licenses per 100,000 state population—two seemingly 
important traffic-/travel-related factors—have no impact on the rate of state police 
and patrol officers per 100,000 population.  
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Resumen 
Este estudio evalúa los predictores sociales, políticos, económicos, y relativos al 
tráfico y viajes de las fuerzas policiales de autopistas y estatales en Estados Unidos 
de 1981 a 2015. Estimaciones, según el modelo de efectos fijos, y basadas en el 
análisis de 1.635 estado-años, indican que los acercamientos teóricos fundados en la 
teoría de amenazas raciales, y la política partisana y de género explican en parte la 
variación en estos números. Los resultados sugieren que los cambios en la densidad 
de población, la base imponible, el porcentaje de población sin título de bachillerato, 
el índice de crímenes violentos, y el gasto en prestaciones sociales a nivel estatal, así 
como las fluctuaciones en los números de la policía local, también influyen las 
fuerzas de la policía estatal y la organización de patrullas durante este periodo. 
Sorprendentemente, las fluctuaciones en el número de fatalidades en accidentes de 
tráfico estatales por millón de millas viajadas, y el número de carnets de conducir 
por 100.000 habitantes del estado—dos factores relativos al tráfico o viajes que 
parecen importantes—no tienen ningún impacto en los números de la policía estatal.  
Palabras clave: policía estatal, patrulla estatal, efectivos policiales, vigilancia 
policial, control social
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ontemporary state police and highway patrol agencies only 
constitute around 8% of the sworn law enforcement community in 
the United States (Reaves, 2011), on average, yet these 
organizations are an integral part of local, state, and federal government 
efforts to safeguard U.S. citizens from harm1.  For example, state-level 
police forces often manage and implement state-level counterterrorism 
efforts, coordinate responses to state disasters and emergencies, operate 
state crime labs, investigate major crimes, maintain state sex offender 
registries, and perform drug interdiction and traffic stops on state highways 
and roads (Cordner, Seifert & Ursino, 2014; Correia, Reisig & Lovrich, 
1996; Foster & Cordner, 2005). The latter traffic enforcement efforts—
while negatively viewed by individuals who receive citations (Correia et al., 
1996)—are especially important to U.S. public safety (DeAngelo & 
Hansen, 2014). The literature clearly demonstrates that expansions in 
number of highway patrol units within a set area substantially reduces the 
number of traffic violations and accidents in that same area (Cox, 1970; 
Lee, Franz & Wynne, 1979). Conversely, state traffic fatality numbers 
dramatically rise when patrol strength substantially declines (DeAngelo & 
Hansen, 2014). The examination of the relevant factors that affect sworn 
state police and highway patrol strength therefore is a necessary endeavor 
in the effort to maintain and increase public safety in the United States. 
Understanding variation in state-level police strength is important for 
theoretical reasons as well. Specifically, the study of shifts in this outcome 
over time provides additional insight into the persistence of racial, partisan, 
and gendered divisions in U.S. society. Threat theorists (Blumer, 1958) 
posit, for example, that the amount of social control directed at blacks 
within a jurisdiction expands as the percentage of black population 
increases. Most police strength studies support these assertions and indicate 
that black population size at the city, county, and Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (SMSA) levels indeed is positively associated with police 
strength (e.g., Carmichael & Kent, 2014; Jacobs, 1979). However, an 
extensive review of the extant literature reveals that researchers have yet to 
examine whether this relationship also applies to state police organization 
strength. 
C 
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Decisions about police force strength also are inherently political in 
nature. U.S. state-level police organizations are funded by state legislatures 
and report to governors via state police chiefs, police superintendents, or 
public safety directors (Cordner et al., 2014; Cox, 1970). Political 
partisanship and gendered politics thus could substantially influence police 
strength at the state level. For instance, the literature clearly documents a 
positive association between partisanship—specifically, Republican 
strength—in state government and increased social control (i.e., Davey, 
1998; Stucky, Heimer & Lang, 2007; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Jacobs, 
Malone & Iles, 2012; Western, 2006). The correlation between female 
strength in the governor’s office and state legislature and similar outcomes, 
however, is relatively underexplored despite the increasing presence of 
women in state political positions of power over time (Paxton & Hughes, 
2014). 
The current study adds to several relevant literatures by utilizing panel 
data from a variety of sources and a fixed-effects pooled-time series 
estimator to examine the preceding and additional applied and theoretical 
predictors of the number of sworn U.S. highway patrol and state police 
officers per 100,000 state population from 1981 to 2015, net of several 
controls. Specifically, by assessing the impact of expansions in the 
percentage of black population on police force strength at the state level, 
this study adds to ongoing discussions in the racial threat literature2.  This 
research additionally fills gaps in the policing and social control literatures 
by estimating the influence of gendered politics on state police force 
strength. It also adds to the voluminous literature on political partisanship 
by evaluating the relationship between Republican strength in state 
government and the outcome at hand. Finally, this analysis builds on two 
recent descriptive studies of state police organizations (i.e., Cordner, 2011; 
Cordner et al., 2014) and extends several public safety studies by 
determining whether travel- and traffic safety-related factors in fact 
influence state police organization strength over time. 
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Literature Review, Theory, and Hypotheses 
 
Political Partisanship  
 
U.S. state criminal justice policies widely vary based on whether members 
of the Democratic or Republican party control the state legislature and the 
governor’s office. These dissimilarities largely emanate from the fact that 
successful Republican political candidates at the state and federal levels of 
government often enact harsher criminal justice policies consistent with the 
“law and order” and “tough on crime” rhetoric popular on the campaign 
trail during and after the mid-1960s (Beckett, 1997; Scheingold, 2010). For 
example, throughout the time that U.S. police disproportionately targeted 
minorities for drug law violations as a part of the most recent Republican-
initiated “War on Drugs,” Malone (in press) finds that Republican 
legislative strength is positively correlated with the severity of state cocaine 
drug laws (in the South). Stucky et al. (2007) also find that higher 
proportions of state expenditures are allocated for corrections when 
Republican strength in state legislatures expand. Jacobs et al. (2012) show 
that Republican control of state legislatures produces higher state prison 
admission rates and Jacobs and Carmichael (2002) find that the presence of 
a Republican dominated state legislature leads to an increased likelihood 
that a state will have a legal death penalty. Davey (1998), Malone (in 
press), and Western (2006) connect the presence of Republican “law and 
order” governors to more punitive sentences, harsher drug laws, and 
escalating imprisonments as well. 
Additionally, the latter studies together suggest that Republicans favor 
reactive responses to crime that incapacitate criminals after the fact over 
proactive strategies that claim to attack the root causes of crime (Beckett, 
1997). If these inclinations extend to reactive social controls besides 
imprisonments and capital punishment, Republican control of state 
government should affect highway patrol and state police strength in 
markedly different ways. For instance, states that utilize the highway patrol 
as their primary state law enforcement agency also operate major state 
criminal investigative units (e.g., Bureaus of Investigation) that are 
independent of the former agency (Cordner, 2011; Cordner et al., 2014). 
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Accordingly, the more reactive criminal investigative functions of state 
police detectives are funded and managed separately from the proactive 
traffic enforcement responsibilities of the highway patrol in these states 
(Taylor et al., 1985)3.  Republicans who seek to enhance their “tough on 
crime” credentials and curb expansions in predatory street crime can do so 
by voting for funding expansions in agencies that contain sworn state 
detectives with relatively little or no concern for sworn officer strength in 
highway patrol agencies. Consequently, this study hypothesizes that 
highway patrol strength should decline after Republicans gain control 
of the legislature and the governor’s office in these states (H1).  
States that rely upon state police as their primary state law enforcement 
agency, conversely, locate their traffic patrol and criminal investigation 
divisions within the same agency (Foster & Cordner, 2005). Selectively 
altering sworn police strength based on political preferences thus is more 
complicated in these states. However, Republicans still can maintain or 
even promote a reactive approach to crime control in several ways. For 
example, for previously stated reasons, these officials can summarily reject 
any requests for increased patrol strength and recommend that patrol 
divisions make do with their current officers. Republicans also can 
encourage state police chiefs to transfer or promote officers from patrol to 
detective divisions to achieve greater investigative strength. Additionally, 
these politicians can mandate that all increased funding for sworn officers 
be directed to divisions that investigate crime and incapacitate criminals. 
Given these options, this study hypothesizes that state police strength 
should remain unchanged or increase after Republicans take charge of 
the state government (H2). 
  
Gendered Politics  
 
While the policing and social control literature has devoted substantial 
attention to the impact of political partisanship on social control, the 
relevance of gendered politics to such outcomes remains largely 
unexamined. This oversight is surprising for two related reasons. First, the 
ranks of state legislatures and governors’ offices—which state police forces 
ultimately are accountable to—have increasingly been filled by women 
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over the last three to four decades (Paxton & Hughes, 2014; Thomas & 
Welch, 1991). Second, the policy preferences of women in state 
government substantially vary from those of their male counterparts on 
several issues. Regarding the latter, for example, Heidbreder and Scheurer 
(2013) find that female governors place a higher priority on state social 
welfare policies than male governors and Thomas and Welch (1991) 
indicate that women in state legislatures prioritize bills that address welfare, 
women, children, and family issues. Caiazza (2004) locates a positive 
relationship between women’s political representation in state government 
and the eventual enactment of women friendly policies at the state level. 
Thomas (1991) similarly discovers that in states where female 
representation in the legislature is higher, women tend to prioritize and pass 
more bills related to women, children, and family issues than their male 
counterparts. 
Importantly, Kathlene (1995) demonstrates that male and female 
politicians also characterize the causes of and solutions to crime in starkly 
different terms. Regarding the former, Kathlene (1995) explains that male 
politicians view crime as the result of rational individual choices and 
personal deficiencies while female politicians are more apt to locate the 
root causes of crime in societal-level factors such as poor education systems 
or job opportunities. Such disparate views on the causes of crime 
expectedly lead to disagreements over the proper policy solutions to crime. 
According to Kathlene (1995), male legislators are more likely to advocate 
for reactive sanctions that include longer criminal sentences. Female 
legislators, on the other hand, tend to be more proactive, focus on the social 
conditions that lead to crime, and prefer legislation that prevents crime from 
occurring in the first place (e.g., through increased funding for early 
childhood education). The latter assertions also partially align with Yates 
and Fording (2005), who show that increasing percentages of women in 
state legislatures reduce black imprisonment rates within states. 
If the influence of gendered politics described by the preceding scholars 
extends to the study of state-level policing, highway patrol and state police 
strength should be affected in remarkably different ways. Namely, because 
highway patrol organizations are proactive organizations whose officers 
primarily patrol highways and unincorporated roadways in an effort to 
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increase police visibility and prevent traffic-related violations, accidents, 
and deaths (Taylor et al., 1985), this study hypothesizes that highway 
patrol strength should increase following the election of a woman to the 
governor’s office and after the percentage of women in the state 
legislature increases (H3). As previously detailed, however, state police 
style agencies employ a sizeable number of sworn detectives who operate 
as reactive forces. Given the findings of Kathlene (1995), it seems likely 
that female politicians—when their numbers or positions permit—will 
attempt to weaken the reactive and promote the proactive components of 
state police agencies. Accordingly, this study additionally hypothesizes that 
after the election of a woman to the governor’s office and as the 
percentage of women in the state legislature increases, state police 
strength should remain unchanged or decrease (H4).  
 
Racial Threat Theory  
 
Proponents of racial threat theory assert that as the percentage of 
minorities—in this particular case, blacks—within a jurisdiction increases 
in size, the amount of discrimination and social control directed towards the 
racial group by whites also increases (Blumer, 1958). According to Bobo 
and Hutchings (1996), this occurs because whites perceive blacks as 
interlopers whose expanding population size unjustly endangers the long-
established, hard-won cultural and political dominance of whites. But 
whereas white responses to black threat in decades past were formal (e.g., 
Jim Crow laws) and informal (e.g., lynchings) in nature (Jacobs et al., 
2012), contemporary whites mainly utilize formal political pathways to 
accomplish their goals. Specifically, the latter group lobbies for and elects 
public officials who promise to implement harsher state-sanctioned social 
controls that can be used to target blacks. 
The preceding account of the association between racial politics and 
social control receives considerable support in the literature. Giles and 
Buckner (1993) and Giles and Hertz (1994), for example, respectively show 
that white voters in Louisiana are willing to vote for openly racist political 
candidates and defect from the Democratic party in areas with higher 
percentages of registered black voters and where voting-age black 
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population percentages are rising. Importantly, several studies demonstrate 
that these political reactions are not exclusive to Louisiana and produce 
harsher state-level social controls across the United States. Jacobs and 
Carmichael (2002) indicate that the legalization of the death penalty is more 
likely in states with higher percentages of blacks while Smith (2004) 
reveals that the percentage of blacks in a state is positively correlated with 
state-level imprisonments.  
A substantial number of studies also detect a positive relationship 
between black population size and police strength. Jacobs (1979), for 
instance, finds that greater black presence at the SMSA level results in 
more law enforcement personnel per 100,000 population in 1970. Lizotte, 
Mercy, and Monkkonen (1982) indicate that increasing black population 
percentages lead to growth in police per capita in Chicago between 1947 
and 1970. Kent and Jacobs (2005) utilize a fixed-effects panel design and 
find that expansions in the group size of blacks increases the number of 
sworn police officers per 100,000 population in large U.S. cities. Recent 
U.S. city-level, fixed-effects panel studies by Carmichael and Kent (2014) 
and McCarty, Ren, and Zhao (2012) buttress the preceding threat-related 
conclusions as well.  
Overall, the literature generally indicates that there is a positive and 
substantial correlation between black threat and police strength in the 
United States (Sever, 2001). The possibility of the existence of a similar 
relationship between black population size and U.S. state-level police 
strength thus appears more likely than not. And because increased social 
control over blacks can be achieved utilizing sworn patrol and investigative 
officers (e.g., see Harris’ (1999) discussion of the intersection of the racial 
profiling of minorities by police during the most recent U.S. drug war, as 
well as Kleiman’s (1988) account of the use of state police to target open-
air drug markets), this study hypothesizes that highway patrol and state 
police strength should increase as the percentage of black population 
increases within a state (H5).   
Additionally, studies by Greenberg, Kessler, and Loftin (1985); Holmes, 
Smith, Freng, and Munoz (2008); and Nalla, Lynch, and Leiber (1997) 
intimate that the effects of minority threat on police strength, budgets, and 
patrol practices may vary across region. Works by King (2007) and Sever 
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(2001) buttress this claim and show that variation in certain U.S. social 
control measures are indeed attributable to regional differences in the 
effects of black group threat. Considered in tandem with Cordner (2011), 
who explains that the largest state police forces tend to be located in the 
Northeastern United States while the smallest generally are found in the 
sheriff-dominated South, the preceding studies plausibly suggest, and this 
study hypothesizes, that the effects of black population increases on 
highway patrol and state police strength may vary by region (H6). 
  
Travel- and Traffic-Related Determinants  
 
Fluctuations in factors that independently affect travel and traffic safety 
may also influence the sworn officer strength in highway patrol 
organizations as well as the patrol divisions of state police organizations. 
For example, as state unemployment levels rise, people drive less. Fewer 
miles driven usually translates into less crowded roads and smaller numbers 
of motor vehicle-related deaths (Evans & Graham, 1988; Leigh & Waldon, 
1991). Fewer highway deaths, in turn, should reduce the need for patrol 
officers. Conversely, factors that reduce highway safety or lead to greater 
numbers of vehicle deaths on state roads should increase the need for patrol 
officers. Specifically, as the number of licensed drivers expands in a state, it 
is reasonable to assume that patrol officer strength also will increase to 
maintain a requisite level of public safety. This study incorporates variables 
that account for both of the previously detailed factors. 
Individuals who do not graduate high school are at a substantially 
greater risk of being involved in fatal automobile accidents than those who 
successfully complete high school (Braver, 2003; Cubbin, LeClere, & 
Smith, 2000). This study therefore adds a predictor that captures the 
proportion of the state population without a high school degree and expects 
a positive association between this variable and patrol officer strength. The 
effects of population density on this outcome are considered as well. Clark 
and Cushing (1999) show that as population density increases within an 
area, fatal crash rates decrease. A factor driving this relationship, according 
to these authors, is proximity and transportation to appropriate medical 
resources after a serious motor vehicle crash. If accurate, more densely 
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populated states should have fewer traffic fatalities and less need for patrol 
officers to monitor traffic. Additionally, it is plausible that the 
aforementioned factors do not fully capture all of the causes of higher 
traffic fatality rates that arguably lead to enhanced state police and highway 
patrol strength. This research accounts for this possibility by additionally 
including a measure for state traffic fatalities expressed as a rate per million 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT). By adjusting traffic fatalities by state VMT 
per year, this study also indirectly controls for changes in other relevant 
transportation-related factors such as highway system length and the 
presence of mass transit (Houston, Richardson, & Neeley, 1995).  
 
Controls  
 
Since state police organizations provide patrol and investigative services to 
rural and semi-rural areas not otherwise supported by local police or county 
sheriffs (Coate & Schwester, 2009), a state’s degree of rurality should be 
positively associated with state police strength. Additionally, expansions in 
police strength and other social controls usually are contingent upon the 
capacity of the government to fund such items (Greenberg et al., 1985; Kent 
& Jacobs, 2005). This study thus controls for real state tax revenues per 
capita as well. Beckett and Western (2001) also find some support for a 
connection between state social welfare and penal policies and explain that 
expansions in state spending on the former policies may signal a less 
punitive stance on the latter policies. If this claim is accurate and extends to 
spending on sworn state police forces, state shifts toward a social welfare 
approach to managing crime should result in increased spending (or at least 
the maintenance of current spending) on proactive highway patrol 
organizations and strength and reduced spending on more reactive state 
police forces. Accordingly, this study also accounts for real state 
expenditures on education, public welfare, and health per capita. 
The persistence or rapid increase of violent crime within state borders 
threatens order and raises doubts about a state’s ability to protect its citizens 
from harm. To maintain legitimacy in these situations, governments often 
respond by increasing the resources available for social control and 
targeting those they deem most challenging to their authority (Weber, 
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1946). Increases in the violent crime rates consequently should result in 
greater spending on the reactive, investigative elements of state police 
forces, yet are likely to have little—if any—effect on highway patrol 
strength. In addition to controlling for the violent crime rate in each state-
year, this study also considers the impact of the number of sworn local 
police officers and sheriffs per 100,000 population in each state. As is the 
case with several other variables in this study, the influence of the number 
of local officers varies by type of state police organization. Specifically, the 
creation or expansion of patrol units in suburban police departments (Reiss, 
1992) simultaneously eliminates the need for highway patrol units and 
increases the opportunity to collaborate with state police officers that “assist 
smaller local agencies with serious criminal and internal investigations, 
complex traffic crash investigations, special event security, dignitary 
protection, and critical incident (SWAT) response” in these areas over time 
(Cordner et al., 2014, p.8). Accordingly, expansions in the number of local 
and county sworn officers per 100,000 population should reduce highway 
patrol officer strength and lead to the maintenance of or expansions in state 
police officer strength.  
 
Methods 
 
Sample  
 
Data for two key predictors (i.e., percentage non-Hispanic blacks and the 
number of local sworn police officers and sheriffs per 100,000 population) 
are not available before 1980. The use of a partisan legislative variable—
Republican control of the state legislature—eliminates Nebraska from all 
analyses. The state legislature in Nebraska is nonpartisan. Furthermore, 
because Hawaii lacks an official state police organization, the state is 
excluded from analyses as well. The latest year that data for the dependent 
variable is available is 1998 in Arkansas; 2007 in Mississippi; 2011 in 
Alabama and Georgia; 2013 in Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, and 
Wyoming; 2014 in Alaska, Kentucky, and New Mexico; and 2015 in all 
other states. These data limitations—along with the use of one-year lags on 
the independent variables (save the region indicators, the state police 
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indicator, and the year trend terms)—together lead to analyses of U.S. state 
police force strength based on 1,635 state-years.  
 
Measurement  
 
Dependent Variable: U.S. state-level police strength is conventionally 
measured with the number of sworn highway patrol and state police 
officers, divided by state population, and multiplied by 100,000 to obtain a 
rate per 100,000 state population.  
 
Independent Variables: Racial threat is measured with the percentage of 
non-Hispanic blacks in a state. Political partisanship is assessed using two 
indicator variables: Republican control of the state legislature and the 
presence of a Republican governor. Respectively, the variables are coded as 
“1” if Republicans occupy greater than 50% of seats in each chamber of 
state legislature and if a Republican holds the position of governor. The 
effects of gendered politics also are assessed using two variables: 
percentage of women in the state legislature and the presence of a female 
governor. The former variable is calculated by averaging the mean 
percentage of women across both chambers of the state legislature while the 
latter variable is coded as “1” if a female holds the position of governor. 
Five variables are utilized to assess travel- and traffic-related factors. 
Unemployment is gauged with the percentage of unemployed individuals in 
a state. The rate of licensed drivers in a state is calculated by dividing total 
number of licensed drivers by the subpopulation of eligible drivers (those 
age 15 and older) in a state and then multiplying by 100,000. The 
percentage of the state population without a high school degree is 
calculated using data obtained from Mark Frank (2014). Specifically, the 
percentage of state residents with a high school degree is subtracted from 
100 to yield the percentage without a high school degree. Population 
density is measured by dividing state population by the total square miles of 
land in a state. The number of state traffic fatalities are divided by the 
number of vehicle miles traveled in a state to obtain vehicle fatalities per 
million VMT. 
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State rurality is measured as the percentage of state residents employed 
in rural job sectors (i.e., crop production, animal production, forestry, 
logging, fishing, hunting, and trapping). The capacity of state government 
to pay for increased police strength is captured by dividing real state tax 
revenues by state population to yield per capita real state tax revenues. The 
violent crime rate per 100,000 state population is obtained from Uniform 
Crime Reports and includes forcible rape, robbery, murder (and non-
negligent manslaughter), and aggravated assault. Local sworn officers per 
100,000 population is assessed by dividing the total number of sworn local 
police officers and county sheriffs by state population and multiplying by 
100,000. 
The indicator for state police denotes state police agencies that include 
major internal state investigative as well as patrol units. States that meet 
these criteria include: Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, and West Virginia. Hawaii’s Department of Public Safety was 
classified as a special jurisdiction agency until recently and is excluded 
from all analyses (Reaves, 2011). For previously detailed reasons, Nebraska 
also is excluded from this study. All remaining states utilize highway patrol 
style agencies and major external state investigative units. Finally, the 
regional dummy variables for South, West, Midwest, and Northeast are 
based on U.S. Census definitions. 
To reduce skew and minimize the effect of any outliers (Western, 2006), 
the aforementioned continuous variables—except for percentage black and 
percentage women in the state legislature—are converted to natural log 
form. Since the dependent variable and many of the independent variables 
are expressed in natural log form, interpretations of changes in the logged 
predictors are expressed as elasticities when possible. Elasticities are the 
percentage change in the dependent variable that result from a percentage 
change in the independent variable. To avoid potential problems with 
simultaneity and to allow sufficient time for the predictors to affect the 
outcome at hand, all explanatory variables (except for region dummies, the 
state police dummy, and the year trend terms) are lagged by one year. 
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Descriptive statistics and data sources for the preceding variables are 
provided in Appendixes B and C, respectively.  
 
Estimation  
 
Because this study examines the determinants of changes in state police 
organization strength over time, data for the independent and dependent 
variables consist of repeated observations at yearly intervals. Random-
effects and fixed-effects regression estimators are specifically designed to 
handle this type of data (Mundlak, 1978). While a Hausman (1978) test 
typically is utilized to select between the two estimators, the detection of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the sample data requires the use of 
cluster-robust standard errors to correct for the latter conditions and 
precludes the use of a Hausman test. Accordingly, this study relies upon the 
Mundlak approach to select the most appropriate estimator. Results from a 
joint F-test conducted as a part of the latter approach suggest that the 
predictors in a random-effects model are correlated with unobserved, time-
invariant variables, which leads to omitted variable bias. Consequently, a 
fixed-effects estimator—which automatically controls for unobserved time-
invariant variables—and cluster-robust standard errors are employed in all 
subsequent models. Years trend variables and their squares also are 
incorporated into this study’s more comprehensive models to control for 
long-term changes in the dependent variable not attributable to specific 
years and not otherwise explained by included predictors4.   
 
Analyses 
 
Initial and Interactive Fixed-Effects Multivariate Analyses 
 
Model 1 in Table 1 introduces a year trend and all primary theoretical, 
travel- and traffic-related, and control variables into the equation. 
Importantly, Model 1’s Akaike information criterion (AIC) statistic of         
-2782.6 provides a baseline from which subsequent models may be 
evaluated. Lower AIC statistics (i.e., more negative) in subsequent models 
indicate better model fit. Models 2 through 5 retain all of the variables 
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Table 1.  
Initial and Interactive Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Determinants of Sworn 
Highway Patrol and State Police Strength, 1981-2015 (N=1635) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All models utilize clustered standard errors that are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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contained in Model 1 and respectively interact indicators for the South, 
West, Midwest, and Northeast with the percentage black variable to test for 
regional variation in the effects of black threat. As demonstrated by the 
presence of a significant interaction term and a lower AIC statistic equal to 
-2887.2, results from Model 5 support the findings of King (2007) and 
Sever (2001)—who locate regional variation in the effects of black threat 
on social controls—and provides the best model fit thus far. Results from 
the latter model also indicate that the state unemployment percentage, 
percentage of population without a high school degree, and population 
density matter. None of the political variables included in Model 5, 
however, are significantly correlated with highway patrol and state police 
organization strength. 
 
Additional Interactive Fixed-Effects Multivariate Analyses  
 
Models 6 through 9 in Table 2 interact controls for percentage real spending 
on social welfare, violent crime rates, and the number of local sworn 
officers per 100,000 state population with an indicator for state police 
organizations. The reference category for each interaction with state police 
is highway patrol. Additionally, Model 6 interacts the state police indicator 
with the racial threat and political variables, Model 7 tests for possible 
interactions between the main effects for the political variables, and Model 
8 interacts the state police indicator with the political interactions inserted 
into the equation in Model 7. Model 9 retains all of the significant 
interactions from Models 7 and 8, adds a squared year trend variable, and is 
considered this study’s best model. Model 9’s AIC statistic (equal to            
-3108.6) also buttresses the latter assertion. 
Results from Model 9 indicate that state unemployment percentage and 
population density are negatively correlated with this outcome and that the 
percentage of the population without a high school degree is positively 
associated with state police and patrol organization strength. Tax revenue 
per capita and the number of local sworn officers per 100,000 state 
population also are shown to influence these police organizations. But 
whereas the impact of the tax base is positively correlated with state police 
and highway patrol strength, the influence of the number of local police 
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officers and sheriffs is mixed. As anticipated, increases in the latter 
numbers result in reductions in highway patrol strength and increases in 
state police strength. The effects of other predictors vary according to 
organization type as well. For instance, growth in social welfare spending 
and the violent crime rate at the state level leads to a reduction and 
expansion in state police strength, respectively, yet neither predictor 
impacts highway patrol strength. 
Partisan politics, gendered politics, and racial threat matter to the 
outcome at hand as well. Specifically, the transition from a male, 
Democratic governor to a male, Republican governor results in growth in 
state police strength. The transition from a male, Democratic governor to a 
female, Republican governor interestingly results in decreases in highway 
patrol strength. Results also indicate, however, that a transition to a female, 
Democratic governor; Republican control of the state legislature; and 
increasing percentages of women in the state legislature have no impact on 
state police and highway patrol strength5. Finally, Model 9 results show that 
expansions in percentage of blacks in states in the Northeastern United 
States lead to growth in state police strength.  There is no evidence that 
similar expansions in black population size within states in other regions 
generate similar results in state police or highway patrol organizations. 
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Table 2.  
Additional Interactive Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Determinants of Sworn 
Highway Patrol and State Police Strenght, 1981-2015 (N=1635) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued) 
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All models utilize clustered standard errors that are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  
†  All states in the Northeastern United States utilize a state police-type style organization.  
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study builds on two contemporary descriptive studies of state police 
organizations (i.e., Cordner, 2011; Cordner et al., 2014) as well as several 
public safety and social science studies by examining the social, political, 
economic, and traffic-/travel-related determinants of the number of U.S. 
sworn highway patrol and state police officers per 100,000 state population. 
As anticipated, several traffic- and travel-related factors influence state 
police organization strength in the United States. In terms of elasticities and 
according to this study’s best model (Model 9 in Table 2), a 10% growth in 
the state unemployment rate results in a 0.6% reduction in state police and 
highway patrol force strength while the same percentage increase in 
population density leads to a substantial 5.6% decrease in this outcome. 
Conversely, a 10% expansion in the percentage of state population without 
a high school degree generates a 2% rise in police force strength. Somewhat 
surprisingly, changes in the state rate of licensed drivers and traffic 
fatalities have no impact on highway patrol and state police officer strength. 
The nonsignificance of the latter variables, however, likely are a 
consequence of independently accounting for intervening variables (i.e., 
unemployment and population density) that contribute to state traffic 
fatality rates. 
As is the case with other social controls in the United States (Jacobs et 
al., 2012), the tax base matters to the outcome at hand. Specifically, a 10% 
increase in state tax revenue per capita yields about a 1% increase in state 
police and patrol force strength. In accord with expectations derived from 
the work of Weber (1946), growth in state violent crime rates affect state 
police—but not highway patrol—strength. In terms of elasticities, a 10% 
increase in a state’s combined murder, forcible rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault rates result in an approximate 1.7% expansion in the 
number of sworn state police officers per 100,000 state population. Best 
model results additionally indicate that increased spending on social 
welfare has no effect on highway patrol strength, yet considerably reduces 
spending on state police strength. A 10% increase in social welfare 
spending leads to around a 5.2% drop in the latter’s force strength. Also as 
hypothesized, changes in local police strength influence state police and 
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highway patrol organizations in different ways. Increases in the number of 
local police officers and sheriffs per 100,000 population reduces the need 
for, and hence the rate of, highway patrol officers, yet increases the rate of 
state police officers who collaborate with local officials during complex 
crimes, traffic investigations, and critical incident responses. Overall, a 
10% increase in sworn local police strength leads to an approximate 2.4% 
reduction in a highway patrol officer strength and a remarkable 5.7% 
growth in a state police strength. In terms of elasticities, the latter effects 
are the strongest in this study.  
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Davey, 1998; Kathlene, 1995; 
Western, 2006), this research finds that partisan and gendered politics also 
matter to state police and patrol strength. Yet, the effects of partisanship 
and gendered politics on this outcome are more complex than previously 
hypothesized. Plausible interactions between several political variables 
reveal that a transition from a male, Democratic governor to a male, 
Republican governor results in a 5% growth in state police strength, yet 
makes no significance difference in terms of highway patrol strength. A 
transition from a male, Democratic governor to a female, Republican 
governor, on the other hand, leads to a 9.8% decrease in patrol strength and 
does not significantly impact state police strength. Results also indicate that 
transitions from a male, Democratic governor to a female, Democratic 
governor are virtually indistinguishable in terms of highway patrol and state 
police force strength. Interestingly, the preceding findings in tandem 
suggest that female, Republican governors pursue party over gender 
interests while the political actions of female, Democratic governors align 
with their party and gender interests when making decisions about police 
strength at the state level. 
This study also locates a positive, significant relationship between black 
threat and state police strength in the Northeastern United States. Yet this 
discovery, while consistent with Cordner’s (2011) documentation of large 
state police force numbers in the region, raises the question, “Why does 
state police strength only grow in response to black threat in the 
Northeast?”. A plausible answer can be derived from the socio-historical 
work of Bechtel (1995). Specifically, the latter author reveals that 
throughout the early 20th century, politicians and business owners in this 
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historically industrialized region increasingly advocated for and relied upon 
state police forces (instead of local police or state militia) to control threats 
and violence emanating from organized labor disputes. Given this 
precedent, it seems likely that contemporary state police forces in the 
Northeast continue to play an active part in the suppression of groups 
deemed politically or economically threatening to dominant societal groups. 
It further follows that the targeting of black motorists by state police in the 
Northeast region during the most recent U.S. drug war (see Harris, 1999 for 
details) may in fact be partly attributable to blacks’ subordinate group 
position vis-à-vis whites, not the individual racial prejudices of white 
officers. As Blumer (1958) explains, the seemingly individual-based acts of 
racial prejudice by majority group members towards subordinate group 
members are based on former perceiving themselves as representatives of 
the dominant racial group and the latter as representatives of subordinate 
racial group. Accordingly, future studies of racial profiling by state police 
organizations should consider accounting for state-level contextual 
factors—especially the percentage of black population—in their analyses to 
arrive at the most accurate conclusions. 
In sum, this research utilizes a fixed-effects estimator and panel data to 
assess the influence of race, politics, the economy, and travel-/traffic- 
related factors on sworn highway patrol and state police force strength in 
the United States between 1981 and 2015. Analyses indicate that racial 
threat theory partly explains variation in this outcome over time, but only in 
the Northeastern United States. Other theory-based predictors resulting 
from interactions between partisan and gendered political variables account 
for fluctuations in state police and highway patrol strength as well. 
Additionally, findings suggest that changes in population density, the tax 
base, the percentage of the population without a high school degree, violent 
crime rates, and spending on social welfare at the state level, as well as 
shifts in local law enforcement strength, influence state police and patrol 
organization strength over this period. Surprisingly, fluctuations in the 
number of state traffic fatalities per million vehicle miles traveled and the 
number of driver’s licenses per 100,000 state population—two seemingly 
important traffic-/travel-related factors—have no impact on the rate of 
sworn state police and patrol officers per 100,000 state population. 
24  Malone – Race, Politics, and Public Safety 
 
 
Notes 
1 In 2008, for instance, state police and highway patrol organizations employed 60,772 of the 
765,246 full-time sworn law enforcement officers utilized at the federal, state, special 
jurisdiction, and local levels of government (Reaves, 2011). Figures A1 through A4 in 
Appendix A depict the variation in the average raw and per 100,000 population numbers of 
sworn officers in state police and highway patrol organizations (excluding Hawaii and 
Nebraska) between 1981 and 2015. 
2 This study does not examine ethnic (i.e., Hispanic) group threat. A reliable measure of 
percent Hispanic is unavailable for many of the state-years between 1981 and 2015. 
3 Sworn officers in Bureaus of Investigation are not included in the counts for highway 
patrol-style agencies. 
4 The present research cannot incorporate year dummy variables because the number of 
variables in each equation would exceed the number of clusters (k-1) used to calculate the 
standard errors and result in an invalid global F-test for the model. 
5 All Northeastern U.S. states utilize a state-police type organization. Accordingly, the cell 
for highway patrol-type organizations in this region is a structural zero, automatically 
omitted by the statistical program, and not further discussed. 
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Appendix A 
Figure A1. Variation in the Average Number of Sworn Officers in State Police 
Organizations, 1981-2015  
Figure A2. Variation in the Average Number of Sworn Officers in State Police 
Organizations per 100,000 Population, 1981-2015  
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Figure A3. Variation in the Average Number of Sworn Officers in Highway 
Patrol Organizations, 1981-2015  
 
 
Figure A4. Variation in the Average Number of Sworn Officers in Highway 
Patrol Organizations per 100,000 Population, 1981-2015  
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1.  
Predicted Signs, Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Variables (N =1,635) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Data Sources 
 
Sworn State Police and Highway Patrol Officers and Violent Crime Rates: 
Uniform Crime Reports. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
 
Population: Census of Population and Housing. U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Percentage Black: Population Estimates. U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Republican Governor, Female Governor, and Republican Control of the 
Legislature: Klarner, Carl. 2011. State Partisanship Balance and State 
Elections Data Files. http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm 
 
Percentage Women in Legislature: Center for American Women and 
Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University.  
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/levels_of_office/state_legislature 
 
Percentage Unemployment and Rural: Bureau of Labor Statistics. U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
 
Number of Driver’s Licenses: Federal Highway Administration. U.S. 
Department of Transportation. 
 
Land Area: Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing 
Geographic Database. U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Traffic Fatalities and Vehicle Miles Traveled: Fatality Analysis Reporting 
System. U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 
 
Real Tax Revenue and Social Welfare Expenditures: Government Finance 
Statistics. U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Sworn Local Police Officers and County Sheriffs: Government Employment 
and Payroll Data. U.S. Census Bureau. 
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